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Abstract 
People's just world beliefs are related to how they feel and behave towards others: the 
stronger people hold beliefs that the world treats them fairly, the more they feel and act pro‐
socially towards others. It is conceivable, therefore, that pro‐social feelings and behaviours 
towards others can strengthen people's personal belief in a just world, especially when people 
expect these positive feelings to be returned. Because mimicry enhances pro‐social feelings 
towards others, we argue that mimicry may strengthen peoples’ personal just world beliefs via 
positive feelings for the mimicked person and the expectation that these positive feelings are 
returned. Moreover, we expect these effects to be more pronounced for men because men 
have stronger reciprocity beliefs than women. The results of three studies supported this line 
of reasoning, showing that mimicry made men believe more strongly that the world is 
personally just to them. Further support for our line of reasoning was obtained by positive 
feelings for the (non)mimicked person (Study 2) and reciprocity beliefs (Study 3) mediating 
the effects. Taken together, the findings suggest that mimicry makes men view the world as 
more just. 
 
  
Over the last 30 years, our psychological understanding of just world beliefs has increased. 
Research showing that beliefs that the world is just for the self are related to helping 
behaviour, trust, and forgiveness suggests that people's personal belief in a just world reflects 
people's pro‐sociality (e.g., Lucas, Young, Zhdanova, & Alexander, 2010; Strelan, 2007). 
Therefore, it is conceivable that when people's pro‐social feelings towards others are 
enhanced, for instance by mimicking others, this could lead to stronger beliefs that the world 
is just for the self. To further enhance our understanding of just world beliefs, we investigate 
whether mimicking others influences people's just world beliefs. More specifically, the aim of 
the present paper is to investigate whether mimicry affects peoples’ beliefs about whether 
they are being treated fairly by the world. It is important to investigate this because people 
often mimic each other in everyday life (e.g., Cheng & Chartrand, 2003) and because just 
world beliefs influences how people perceive other people around them and how they 
perceive events that happen in the world (e.g., Furnham, 2003). Whether mimicry affects 
peoples’ just world beliefs has, to date, not been empirically investigated. 
 
Mimicry 
Mimicry is defined as ‘doing what others are doing’; a non‐conscious tendency to imitate 
others’ behaviours (Stel, Van Baaren, & Vonk, 2008). Research has often demonstrated that 
we mimic other peoples’ behaviours, postures, gestures, mannerisms, words, accents, speech 
rates, and facial expressions outside of our awareness (e.g., Bernieri, 1988; Chartrand & 
Bargh, 1999; Chartrand & Van Baaren, 2009; Dimberg 1982; Webb, 1972). A consequence of 
mimicry is that people have more positive feelings for others: mimickers and mimickees rate 
each other more positively than people who do not mimic each other (e.g., Chartrand & 
Bargh, 1999). One explanation for this finding is that when mimicking, people are more 
physically similar to each other (e.g., Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). Furthermore, when 
mimicking the facial expressions of another person, one is likely to feel similar emotions as 
the mimickee (e.g., Stel et al., 2008) because of the feedback effects of the facial muscles that 
are activated by mimicking on corresponding emotions (e.g., Tomkins, 1982). As a result, 
mimickers are better able to understand the emotions of others, and they also report more 
empathy for the person being mimicked. Thus, mimicking others leads people to have more 
positive feelings for others due to feeling more similar to the mimicked person and 
experiencing more understanding for that person. This happens even when the other person is 
expressing sad emotions (Stel et al., 2008). The expectation that positive feelings for the 
person may be reciprocated could lead to stronger beliefs that the world is just. Before we 
elaborate on why mimicry could strengthen just world beliefs, we will first introduce the 
concept of just world beliefs. 
 
Just world beliefs 
Just world beliefs are beliefs about whether the world is a place in which people get what they 
deserve. People who hold strong just world beliefs, strongly believe that good things happen 
to good people and bad things happen to bad people. According to just world theory (Lerner, 
1980), this belief protects us from the view that something bad could happen to us: accepting 
a situation in which a person is unfairly treated badly means that we are also at risk to be 
treated badly. 
 
People have beliefs about whether the world treats them fairly (`Personal Belief in a Just 
World') and beliefs about whether the world treats other people fairly (`Other Belief in a Just 
World'). Both theory and research suggest that personal and other just world beliefs are 
conceptually distinct (e.g., Alves & Correia, 2008; Lucas, Zhdanova, & Alexander, 2011). 
Personal just world beliefs better predict pro‐social orientations and subjective well‐being 
(i.e., Dzuka & Dalbert, 2002; Lipkus, Dalbert, & Siegler, 1996; Lucas et al., 2010; Sutton & 
Winnard, 2007), whereas other just world beliefs better predict anti‐social tendencies (i.e., 
negative and discriminatory reactions to victims, elderly and poor people; Bègue & Bastounis, 
2003; Sutton & Douglas, 2005; Sutton & Winnard, 2007). For instance, Lucas et 
al. (2010) demonstrated that personal just world beliefs were positively associated with 
forgiveness, whereas other just world beliefs were negatively related. 
 
The relationship between personal just world beliefs and pro‐social values may exist because 
both involve a positive perception of humanity (e.g., Lerner, 1980). Additionally, Strelan 
(2007) argued that people who have strong personal just world beliefs are more pro‐social 
because they believe that investments of being pro‐social towards others will be returned. 
Thus, if people believe that the world is fair to them, they act accordingly (Strelan, 2007). 
 
Relationship between mimicry and just world beliefs 
If people's belief about whether the world treats them fairly is related to how people feel and 
behave towards others, it is likely that feelings and behaviours towards others can influence 
one's just world beliefs. Mimicry leads people to feel more positive towards the mimicked 
person (see, e.g., Stel et al., 2008). As people would like these positive feelings to be 
returned, the enhanced positive feelings due to mimicry could lead people to more strongly 
belief that the world should treat them fairly. In other words, the more people feel positive 
emotions for another person, the more they believe that the other person will feel and act 
positive to them as well (e.g., Perugini, Galluci, Presaghi, & Ercolani, 2003). This reciprocity 
belief may strengthen people's belief that the world treats them fairly as it is regarded as fair 
when positive feelings towards another person are returned. Therefore, we expect that when 
you have stronger reciprocity beliefs due to enhanced positive feelings by mimicking, this 
will positively influence your beliefs in a just world. This expectation is in line with the 
findings of Edlund, Sagarin, and Johnson (2007) showing that reciprocity and just world 
beliefs are related. They demonstrated that people with a stronger belief in a just world 
reciprocated a gift more often than people with a less strong belief in a just world. To this 
date, however, we do not know whether stronger reciprocity beliefs influence beliefs in a just 
world as well. 
 
Furthermore, we expect the effect of mimicry on just world beliefs to be more pronounced for 
men than for women as men have stronger reciprocity beliefs than women (e.g., Kahn, Hottes, 
& Davis, 1971; Terhune, 1970). For instance, in games of trust, men are more likely to 
respond with reciprocity to the responses of another person than women (Kahn et al., 1971). 
More specifically, when a person cooperated, men were more likely to cooperate; when a 
person competed, men were more likely to compete. Women showed less reciprocity and 
were more influenced by other cues in their decisions to cooperate or compete. As men have 
stronger reciprocity ideas, they may expect – more than women – that positive feelings for 
another person will be returned to them. So when men mimic another person, they may expect 
more than women that their efforts to connect with this person and the positive feelings they 
have for this person will be reciprocated. These reciprocity beliefs may be projected on the 
world in general. As a result, men's belief that the world is fair to them may be more strongly 
affected than the just world beliefs of women. In sum, we expect that mimicking the non‐
verbal behaviours of others lead to stronger beliefs that the world is personally just, especially 
for men. Moreover, we expect that positive feelings felt for the mimickee and reciprocity 
beliefs mediate this effect. 
 
The present studies 
To investigate the effects of mimicry on personal just world beliefs, we conducted three 
studies in which the amount of mimicry was varied or measured. In Studies 1 and 2, 
participants watched a video fragment and either mimicked or did not mimic the non‐verbal 
movements of the person on the video. In Study 3, we measured participants’ spontaneous 
mimicry reactions to the behaviours of the person on the video. Then, in a part presented as 
unrelated to the first part of the study, we assessed participants’ beliefs in a just world. 
In Study 1, we wanted to find out whether mimicking particularly influences personal just 
world beliefs or influences just world beliefs in general. As we propose positive feelings for 
the mimicked person to be responsible for the effect of mimicry on just world beliefs and as 
personal just world beliefs are related to pro‐social orientation, we expect that mimicry 
influences personal, but not other just world beliefs. In Study 2, we more directly investigated 
whether positive feelings towards the person being mimicked play a role in the link between 
mimicry and just world beliefs. In Study 3, we examined whether reciprocity beliefs are 
affected by mimicry and play a role in the link between mimicry and just world beliefs. 
STUDY 1 
Method 
Participants and design. Participants were 50 students at Tilburg University (39 
women, Mage= 21.10 years, range = 18–37 years). They participated for payment (€3) or 
course credits and were randomly assigned to the conditions of a 2 (mimicry: present vs. 
absent) × 2 (video: male vs. female) between‐participants design. Men and women were 
equally distributed among the mimicry conditions. 
 
Procedure. Participants were told that the experiment consisted of two unrelated parts. In the 
first part, we manipulated participants’ mimicry of the movements of another person; in the 
second part, we measured participants’ beliefs in a just world. First, participants watched a 
video of either a young man or young woman talking about what a typical day looks like for 
him/her. On the 2‐min video, the young person talked about doing a thesis for his/her 
communication study, preparing for an internship in Kenya, and visiting friends and family.  
 
On the video, the upper part of the body was visible. While talking, the person naturally 
showed nine behaviours, one at each time. The behaviours were cheek scratching, hair and 
chin touching, movements of the head, smiling, and frowning. The male and female videos 
were similar in verbal and non‐verbal content: the text was identical and they showed the 
same behaviours. The timing of expressing the non‐verbal behaviours was also similar. The 
male and female target person did not differ in attractiveness, F < 1. 
 
 Before watching this video, participants received instructions to either mimic or not to mimic 
the expressions of the person displayed on the video. The instructions were taken from Stel, 
Van Dijk, and Olivier (2009). Half of the participants received an instruction to mimic the 
movements of the person on the video, while the other half received an instruction not to 
mimic the movements. The instructions for both conditions were specific, guided by 
examples, and were matched for content. All participants received instructions to pay 
attention to specific movements of eyes, eyebrows, mouth, and head. The mimicry present 
group was instructed to mimic these movements; the mimicry absent group not to do so. 
Participants in the mimicry absent group were not instructed to refrain from moving in 
general, they were only asked not to show the same movements as the targets at the same 
time. After the video, participants received some general questions about the video fragment 
to back up the cover story that Parts 1 and 2 were unrelated. 
 
In the second part, participants were asked to evaluate general statements. They 
received Lipkus et al.'s (1996) belief in just world (BJW) scale. This scale measures the 
degree to which people believe that they themselves are being treated fairly by the world 
(personal BJW; e.g., `I feel that the world treats me fairly', `I feel that the awards and 
punishments that I receive are rightly') and the degree to which they believe that other people 
are being treated fairly (other BJW; e.g., `I feel that the world treats other people fairly', `I 
feel that the awards and punishments that other people receive are rightly'). The personal and 
other BJW scales each consisted of eight items, all measured on seven‐point scales (1 
= strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). Cronbach's alpha for the personal BJW scale was 
.84, for the other BJW scale the alpha was .87. 
 
In an open‐ended question, participants were asked if they knew what the study was about. 
None of them reported anything related to the actual goals of our study. Finally, demographic 
variables were assessed. Afterwards, we thanked and debriefed the participants. 
 
Results 
Mimicry. A trained coder rated the movements of all participants and compared these to the 
coded movements of the target person of the video (inter‐reliability between trained coders 
varies between .96 and .98). The movements of the participants were observed and matched 
with the target's movements using a time limit of 5 s. A participants’ movement was scored as 
mimicry if it matched the movement of the target and occurred after that movement within the 
time limit. Thus, if one of the targets’ movements (cheek scratching, hair or chin touching, 
movements of the head, smiling, or frowning) at a certain time were also shown by the 
participant after the targets’ movement and within the time limit, the participants’ movement 
was scored as mimicry. This is the same procedure as used in previous studies (see, Stel et al., 
2008; 2009). Due to technical problems, we did not obtain the mimicry score of one male 
participant. 
 
A 2 (gender of participant: male vs. female) × 2 (mimicry: present vs. absent) × 2 (video: 
male vs. female) analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted on the number of mimicked 
behaviours. A main effect of mimicry, F(1, 41) = 34.86, p < .001, η2= .46, indicated that 
participants who were instructed to mimic mimicked more (M = 5.53, SD = 2.13; 61.48% of 
all the behaviours shown by the target) than participants who were instructed not to mimic 
(M= 0.89, SD = 1.15; 9.94% of all the behaviours shown by the target). There were no other 
main or interaction effects, Fs(1, 41) < 1.78, ps > .19, η2s < .04. 
 
Personal BJW. A 2 (gender of participant: male vs. female) × 2 (mimicry: present vs. absent) 
× 2 (video: male vs. female) ANOVA was conducted on the degree to which participants 
believed the world treats them fairly. Table 1 presents the means and standard deviations. The 
analysis revealed an interaction between gender of the participant and mimicry, F(1, 42) = 
4.89, p = .03, η2= .10. For men, mimicking another person led to a stronger belief that the 
world is personally just (M = 5.36, SD = 0.66) than not mimicking (M = 4.50, SD = 
0.35), F(1, 46) = 5.54, p= .02. There was no effect of mimicry for women (Mmim = 4.44, SD = 
0.82 vs. Mnomim = 4.74, SD= 0.58), F(1, 46) = 2.23, p = .14. The interaction also revealed that 
in the mimicry present condition, men rated the world as more personally just (M = 
5.36, SD = 0.66) compared to women (M = 4.44, SD = 0.82), F(1, 46) = 8.13, p = .01. There 
was no difference between men and women in the mimicry absent condition (Mmen = 
4.50, SD = 0.35 vs. Mwomen = 4.74, SD = 0.58), F < 1. Thus, mimicry made participants more 
strongly believe that the world is personally just, but only for men. There was no interaction 
between gender, mimicry, and video, F < 1. In other words, the obtained effects were not 
different for the male and female video. 
 
 
Table 1. Mean ratings of participants’ personal just world beliefs by mimicry and gender of 
the participant for Study 1 
Mimicry Gender 
Men Women 
M SD M SD 
Present 5.36a 0.66 4.44b 0.82 
Absent 4.50b 0.35 4.74b 0.58 
Note. Means with non‐common sub‐scripts differ significantly (p < .05) within each column. 
 
Other BJW. A 2 (gender of participant) × 2 (mimicry) × 2 (video) ANOVA was conducted 
with as dependent variable the degree to which participants felt that other people are treated 
fairly by the world. This analysis revealed no main or interaction effects, all Fs < 1. 
 
Discussion 
In line with our hypotheses, the results revealed that previously mimicking a person resulted 
men to adhere more strongly to the belief that the world treats them fairly. Mimicry did not 
influence personal just world beliefs among women, nor did it affect participants’ ratings of 
how the world treats other people. These results were obtained regardless whether the person 
on the video was male or female. 
 
The finding that personal, not other, just world belief was affected is in line with our proposed 
mechanism of the effect: we proposed positive feelings for the mimickee to be responsible for 
the effects of mimicry on just world belief and as personal just world beliefs (not other just 
world beliefs) are related to pro‐social orientation, we expected mimicry to affect only 
personal just world beliefs. The current study, however, did not directly show that positive 
feelings for the mimickee are responsible for the effect. To address this limitation, we 
conducted Study 2. 
 
STUDY 2 
Study 1 demonstrated that, for men, mimicking resulted in stronger beliefs that the world is 
personally just. In Study 2, we zoomed in on this effect. That is, a first aim of Study 2 was to 
investigate whether the effect of mimicry on personal just world beliefs could be replicated. A 
second aim was to examine a possible mediator of the effect. As outlined in the introduction, 
we expected that pro‐social feelings for the mimicked person play a role in the link between 
mimicry and just world beliefs. Therefore, in Study 2, we also measured participants’ feelings 
for the mimickee to assess whether these feelings mediated the effect we obtained in Study 1 
and expect to replicate in Study 2. 
 
Method 
Participants and design. Participants were 27 students at Utrecht University (14 women and 
13 men, mean age = 22.04 years, range = 18–27 years). They received €3 or course credits for 
participation. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the conditions of a two (mimicry: 
present vs. absent) between‐participants design. Men and women were equally distributed 
among the mimicry conditions. 
 
Procedure. The procedure was the same as in Study 1, except that participants watched a 
different video. On this 3‐min video, a student talked about doing her thesis and internship for 
her Art History study. She described her activities, what she liked and did not like about those 
activities, and what she had learned during the time in which she did her thesis and internship. 
On the video, her head and part of her shoulders were visible. While talking, she naturally 
moved her head, eyes, eyebrows, mouth, lips, hands, and shoulders. 
 
In addition to measuring participants’ personal beliefs in a just world (measured as in Study 1, 
α= .80), we also measured the participants’ feelings for the person on the video. To assess 
whether participants felt positively or negatively towards the person in the video, we asked 
them to indicate on a seven‐point scale (1 = not at all, 7 = very much) to what level they felt 
enthusiastic, pleased, cheerful happy, sad, angry, tense, worried, irritated, confused, dreary, 
and mad towards the other person (Cronbach's alpha for positive feelings is .85; Cronbach's 
alpha for negative feelings is .87). Finally, none of the participants reported anything related 
to the actual goals of our study when asked in an open‐ended question if they knew what the 
study was about. 
 
Results 
Personal BJW. A 2 (gender of participant) × 2 (mimicry) ANOVA was conducted on the 
degree to which participants believed the world treats them fairly. Table 2 presents the means 
and standard deviations. A main effect of mimicry indicated that mimickers evaluated the 
world as more personally just (M = 5.23, SD = 0.69) than non‐mimickers (M = 4.70, SD = 
0.82), F(1, 23) = 5.22, p = .03, η2= .19. 
 Table 2. Mean ratings of participants’ personal just world beliefs by mimicry and gender of 
the participant for Study 2. 
Mimicry Gender 
Men Women 
M SD M SD 
Present 5.83a 0.73 4.86b 0.32 
Absent 4.63b 1.11 4.79b 0.10 
Note. Means with non‐common sub‐scripts differ significantly (p < .05) within each column. 
 
This main effect was qualified by a gender × mimicry interaction, F(1, 23) = 4.16, p = .05, 
η2= .15. For men, mimicking another person led to a stronger belief that the world is 
personally just (M = 5.83, SD = 0.73) than not mimicking (M = 4.63, SD = 1.11), F(1, 23) = 
7.71, p = .01. There was no effect of mimicry for women (Mmim = 4.86, SD = 0.32 
vs. Mnomim = 4.79, SD = 0.10), F < 1. The interaction also revealed that, as in Study 1, only in 
the mimicry present condition men rated the world as more personally just (M = 5.83, SD = 
0.73) compared to women (M = 4.86, SD = 0.32), F(1, 23) = 4.13, p = .05. There was no 
effect in the mimicry absent condition between men and women (Mmen = 4.63, SD = 1.11 
vs. Mwomen = 4.79, SD = 0.10), F < 1. Thus, mimicry made participants more strongly believe 
that the world is personally just, but only for men. 
 
Feelings. A 2 (gender of participant) × 2 (mimicry) × 2 (feelings) repeated measures ANOVA 
was conducted with participants’ feelings for the person on the video (positive vs. negative) as 
a within‐subjects factor. A main effect of feelings indicated that participants experienced 
more positive emotions for the person on the video (M = 4.50, SD = 0.89) than negative 
emotions (M = 2.02, SD = 0.86), F(1, 23) = 76.75, p < .001, η2= .77. An interaction effect 
between mimicry and feelings demonstrated that participants who mimicked experienced 
more positive feelings (M = 4.75, SD = 0.68) and less negative feelings (M = 1.63, SD = 0.55) 
than participants who did not mimic (respectively, for positive feelings: M = 4.27, SD = 1.02; 
and for negative feelings: M = 2.38, SD = 0.96), F(1, 23) = 5.07, p = .03, η2= .18. Thus, 
mimickers experienced more positive and less negative feelings for the other person than non‐
mimickers. This effect of mimicry and feelings did not differ for men and women, that is, 
there was no gender × mimicry × feelings interaction, F < 1. 
 
Correlations and mediation. For men, positive feelings for the person on the video were 
significantly correlated to personal just world beliefs, r = .61, n = 13, p = .03. This correlation 
was not significant for women, r = .07, n = 14, p = .81. Furthermore, negative feelings were 
marginally significantly correlated to personal just world beliefs for men: r =−.52, n = 13, p = 
.07, but not for women: r = .02, n = 14, p = .94. Therefore, it is possible that feelings for the 
(non)mimicked person mediated the differential mimicry effects for men and women on 
personal just world beliefs. We hypothesized that mimicry affects feelings for the 
(non)mimicked person (main effect), and that gender influences whether these feelings for the 
(non)mimicked person in turn affects personal just world beliefs. To test this possible 
moderated mediation, which is depicted in Figure 1, we used the regression method proposed 
by Muller, Judd, and Yzerbyt (2005). In agreement with Judd, Kenny and McClelland (2001), 
we used the difference score of experienced positive and negative feelings as a dependent 
variable in regression analyses. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Interrelatedness between mimicry, gender, feelings experienced for the 
(non)mimickee, and personal just world beliefs of Study 2 (moderated mediation). 
 
First, a regression with gender, mimicry, and an interaction term of gender and mimicry on 
feelings for the person on the video showed a significant main effect of mimicry, 
β=−.43, t=−2.25, p = .03. Secondly, a regression with gender, mimicry, and an interaction 
term of gender and mimicry on personal just world beliefs produced a main effect of mimicry, 
β= .41, t = 2.28, p = .03, and an interaction effect between gender and mimicry, β= .36, t = 
2.04, p= .05 (same effects as the ANOVA analysis). After inclusion of the mediator 
(feelings), the main effect of mimicry on personal just world beliefs was non‐significant, β= 
.20, t = 1.15, p = .26. Moreover, there was a significant effect of feelings for the 
(non)mimicked person on personal just world beliefs, β=−.49, t =−2.86, p = .01. To test 
whether this mediation was significant, we used a bootstrap method, as proposed by Preacher 
and Hayes (2008). With 1,000 re‐samples, the confidence interval did not contain zero at the 
95% level (indirect effect: CI = .04−.40), indicating that positive feelings was a mediator, p < 
.05. Thus, as hypothesized, mimicry affected positive feelings, which together with gender 
influenced participants’ personal just world beliefs. 
 
Discussion 
The present study replicated the results of Study 1: mimicking others changed participants’ 
belief in a personal just world, but only for men. Furthermore, the present study demonstrated 
that participants’ feelings for the (non)mimickee were responsible for this effect. Both male 
and female mimickers experienced more positive and less negative feelings for the person on 
the video than non‐mimickers. This difference in experienced feelings due to mimicry led 
participants to view the world differently. Specifically, this latter effect of feelings for the 
(non)mimickee influencing just world beliefs occurred for men only. 
We interpret these findings that when people experience more positive feelings for another 
person due to mimicking, they also more strongly expect these positive feelings to be 
returned, which influences their beliefs that the world is just. As men's reciprocity beliefs are 
stronger than women's and are possibly more strongly influenced by increased positive 
feelings due to mimicry, this effect occurred for men only. A limitation of the study is that we 
did not test whether this is the case and whether these beliefs play a mediating role in the 
effect of mimicry on just world beliefs. 
Another limitation of Studies 1 and 2 is that we varied mimicry by instructing participants to 
either mimic or not mimic the expressions of a person. A control group in which no mimicry 
instructions are given would have been useful to show whether men's personal just world 
beliefs are increased due to mimicking or decreased due to not mimicking. Furthermore, we 
do not know whether spontaneous, non‐instructed mimicry would lead to the same effects. 
 
STUDY 3 
Studies 1 and 2 demonstrated that, for men, instructing participants to mimic resulted in 
stronger beliefs that the world is personally just. A first aim of Study 3 was to investigate 
whether the effect of mimicry on personal just world beliefs could be replicated when 
measuring participants’ spontaneous, non‐instructed mimicry reactions. A second aim was to 
examine whether reciprocity plays a role in the effect. Therefore, in Study 3, we observed 
participants’ spontaneous mimicry reactions and assessed participants’ reciprocity beliefs and 
personal just world beliefs. 
 We do not expect the results to be different for spontaneous, non‐instructed mimicry. Both 
instructed as non‐instructed mimicry lead, via facial feedback of the mimicked movements, to 
more empathy and understanding and more liking for the person being mimicked. This has 
been demonstrated in previous studies (e.g., Stel et al., 2009) showing that consequences of 
non‐instructed, spontaneous mimicry does not differ from instructed mimicry. Furthermore, as 
outlined in the introduction, we expect reciprocity to mediate the effect of mimicry on 
personal just world beliefs. 
 
Method 
Participants and design. Participants were 49 students at Utrecht University (26 
women, Mage= 21.92 years, range = 18−36 years). They participated for payment (€3) or 
course credits. The predictor was the amount of mimicry and the dependent variables were 
reciprocity and personal just world beliefs. 
 
Procedure. The procedure was the same as in Study 2, except that this time we measured the 
amount of spontaneous mimicry. Thus, participants did not receive any mimicry instructions 
before they watched the video. While watching the video, their non‐verbal reactions were 
unobtrusively being taped to measure the amount of mimicry participants spontaneously 
engaged in. After the video, participants received a questionnaire measuring reciprocity and 
personal just world beliefs. Reciprocity was measured by the 27‐item reciprocity scale 
by Perugini et al. (2003) (e.g., ‘When I compliment somebody, I expect that this person will 
compliment me as well’, α= .69). Participants’ personal beliefs in a just world were measured 
as in Studies 1 and 2 (α= .82). All items were measured on seven‐point scales (1 = strongly 
disagree, 7 = strongly agree). At the end of the experiment, participants were asked in an 
open‐ended question, if they knew what the study was about. None of them reported anything 
related to the actual goals of our study. 
Results 
Mimicry. Mimicry was coded as in Study 1. The observed movements of the target were 
movements of head, eyes, eyebrows, mouth, lips, hand gestures, and shoulders. In total, 74 
target movements were observed. Due to technical problems with the camera, we did not 
obtain mimicry scores of five participants (three men and two women). 
A 2 (gender of participant) ANOVA was conducted with as dependent variable the number of 
participants’ spontaneous mimicry reactions. The analysis revealed that there was no effect of 
gender, F < 1, ns: the spontaneous mimicry levels of men (M = 9.05, SD = 11.95; 12.23% of 
all the behaviours shown by the target) and women (M = 6.17, SD = 8.77; 8.34% of all the 
behaviours shown by the target) did not differ. 
 
Personal BJW. A regression analyses was conducted with the level of mimicry, gender, and 
an interaction term of the standardized variables mimicry and gender as predictors and with 
the degree to which participants believed the world treats them fairly as dependent variable. 
The interaction between mimicry and gender was significant, β= .30, t = 1.97, p = .05. The 
interaction entails that for men, the more they engaged in spontaneous mimicry, the more they 
believed that the world treats them fairly, β= .44, t = 2.08, p = .05. For women, mimicry did 
not predict their personal belief in a just world, β=−.18, t < 1, ns. There were no main effects 
of mimicry or gender, t < 1, ns. 
 
Reciprocity. A regression analyses was conducted with the level of mimicry, gender, and an 
interaction term of the standardized variables mimicry and gender as predictors and with as 
dependent variable participants’ reciprocity level. An interaction between mimicry and gender 
was marginally significant, β= .26, t = 1.70, p = .10. The interaction entails that for men, the 
more they engaged in spontaneous mimicry, the more they believed that their feelings and 
behaviours would be reciprocated, β= .51, t = 2.49, p = .02. For women, mimicry did not 
predict their reciprocity beliefs, β=−.08, t < 1, ns. There were no main effects of mimicry or 
gender, t < 1, ns. 
 
Mediation. To test whether participants’ reciprocity belief was a mediator in the effect of 
mimicry and gender on personal BJW, we used the regression method proposed by Baron and 
Kenny (1986). The effect of mimicry and gender on personal just world beliefs, β= .30, t = 
1.97, p = .05 (see also above), was non‐significant after inclusion of the mediator 
(reciprocity), β= .23, t= 1.50, p = .14. Moreover, there was a marginally significant effect of 
reciprocity on personal just world beliefs, β= .27, t = 1.77, p = .08. To test whether this 
mediation was significant, we used a bootstrap method, as proposed by Preacher and Hayes 
(2008). With 1,000 re‐samples, the confidence interval did not contain zero at the 95% level 
(indirect effect: CI = .05−.56), indicating that reciprocity was a mediator, p < .05. 
 
Discussion 
The effects of Studies 1 and 2 were replicated when measuring participants’ non‐instructed, 
spontaneous mimicry reactions: spontaneous mimicry reactions were related to personal just 
world beliefs for men, but not for women. Furthermore, reciprocity beliefs mediated this 
effect. Contrary to our expectations, men did not have stronger reciprocity beliefs than women 
in general. They did, however, have stronger reciprocity beliefs than women in the mimicry 
condition. This is not surprising as especially when one feels positive about another person, 
for instance via mimicry, one would like these feelings to be reciprocated. These enhanced 
reciprocity beliefs of men due to mimicry, in turn, affected their personal beliefs in a just 
world. In sum, the results show that the stronger men mimicked, the stronger they believed 
that their feelings will be returned, which in turn affected their beliefs that the world is just for 
them. 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Across three studies, we have demonstrated that mimicry is related to men's personal just 
world beliefs. More specifically, we revealed that instructed mimicking, compared to not 
mimicking, led male participants to stronger beliefs that the world treats them fairly (Studies 
1–2) and that non‐instructed, spontaneous mimicking is related to stronger just world beliefs 
for men (Study 3). In all three studies, these effects were obtained for men, not for women. 
Beliefs about whether the world treats other people fairly remained unaffected by mimicry 
(Study 1). This result that personal just world beliefs, but not other just world beliefs were 
affected was replicated in an additional, unpublished study (Stel & Van den Bos, 
2011).2Finally, in the present studies, we showed that the differential mimicry effect for men 
and women on personal just world beliefs was mediated by their feelings for the person they 
did or did not mimic: when mimicking the expressions of a person, men and women felt more 
positive and less negative towards this person. These feelings played a role in the effect of 
mimicry on personal just world beliefs (Study 2). These positive feelings due to mimicry were 
more strongly expected to be returned by men, which influenced their beliefs about whether 
the world treats them fairly (Study 3). 
These findings extend previous research on mimicry and just world beliefs by showing that 
the two are related. With the current studies, we showed that mimicry influences male's 
beliefs about whether they are treated fairly by the world. As these beliefs influence whether 
we see the world positively and whether we feel and act positive towards others in general, 
our results have important implications. The results imply that when we attempt to socially 
connect with other people, this produces a belief that the world is just for the self because 
people feel more positive emotions for the other person and expect these emotions to be 
returned. 
 
In our studies, we found an effect of mimicry on the personal belief in a just world. The just 
word beliefs were measured with a scale that is normally used to measure stable individual 
differences in people's just world beliefs. Our results are interesting, we believe, because we 
showed that the belief in a just world scale can be influenced depending on the specific 
situation a person is in and on other people that are in that situation. This is in line with the 
findings of Schmitt, Gollwitzer, Maes, and Arbach (2005) showing that a substantial amount 
of variance of justice judgments is not explained by stable individual differences (see 
also Wijn & Van den Bos, 2010). Relatedly, the effects of mimicry are powerful in that they 
showed that mimicking one specific person increased men's beliefs about whether the 
worldgenerally treats them fairly. We expect even stronger effects when people judge fairness 
with regard to the mimicry situation. For example, when people would evaluate whether a 
judgment about them made by another person was fair after they mimicked or not mimicked 
this person. This could be investigated in future research. 
 
A limitation of the present studies is that we did not investigate both mediators, feelings for 
the (non)mimicked person and reciprocity beliefs, in one study. Despite this limitation, we do 
feel that a strong case can be made on the basis of the combination of our findings. 
Furthermore, it is important to note that in Study 3, reciprocity beliefs measured the extent to 
which participants believed that feelings for another person and acts towards another person 
are reciprocated. Thus, the reciprocity beliefs which mediated the effects of mimicry and 
gender on personal just world beliefs did refer to feelings felt for a specific other person. 
We have no indication that the results were due to instruction effects. First, the results of 
Studies 1 and 3 showed that men and women did not show differences in their instructed or 
spontaneous mimicry levels. Most importantly, the results of Study 3 showed that non‐
instructed mimicry affected personal just world beliefs in the same way as instructed mimicry. 
As participants in Study 3 were unaware that we were interested in mimicry behaviour, a 
demand characteristics explanation could not explain the results. Moreover, we can think of 
no reason why men and women and why personal and other beliefs would be differentially 
affected by effects due to instructions. 
 
We interpret the effect of mimicry on personal just world beliefs as caused by specific 
feelings for the mimicked person, which are expected to be returned. Alternatively, one could 
argue that although we asked participants to indicate their feelings towards the person on the 
video, it is possible that mimicry caused them to generally feel more positive and less 
negative. We do think that the results are caused by feelings for the (non)mimicked person 
and not by mood. First of all, previous studies showed no general mood effects due to 
mimicking others, but did show effects on feelings for the mimickee (e.g., see Stel et al., 
2008). More importantly, if the results were due to a general positive mood caused by 
mimicry, one would expect that this positive mood influenced judgments in general. 
However, participants’ beliefs about whether the world treats other people fairly, were 
unaffected by mimicry. Also, please recall that just world beliefs are not necessarily positive 
beliefs: they also entail that punishments were justified. Finally, in Study 3 we showed that 
beliefs about positive and negative feelings for another person and positive and negative acts 
towards another person being reciprocated mediated the effect. 
 
To conclude, this paper extends previous research by showing that mimicry influences just 
world beliefs for men. As people mimic each other continuously in everyday life, our results 
are important because it implies that peoples’ view of being treated fairly by others is 
dynamically influenced by our daily interactions. When having been mimicking the 
movements of another person, men feel that they are being treated more fairly by the world. 
Thus, for men, mimicry makes the world seem as a just place for them! 
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